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Enforcement and Environmental Quality in a Decentralized Emission
Trading System
Summary
This paper addresses the issue of whether the powers of monitoring compliance and
allocating tradeable emissions allowances within a federation of countries should be
appointed to a unique federal regulator or decentralized to several local regulators. To
this end, we develop a two stage game played by environmental regulator(s) and the
polluting industries of two countries. Regulator(s) choose the amount of emission
allowances to be issued and set the level of monitoring effort to achieve full
compliance, while regulated firms choose actual emissions and the number of permits to
be held. We identify various, possibly conflicting, spillovers among states in a
decentralized setting. We show that cost advantage in favor of local regulators is not
sufficient to justify decentralization. Nevertheless, cost differential in monitoring
violations can imply lower emissions and greater welfare under a decentralized
institutional setting than under a centralized one. However, while a better environmental
quality under decentralization is a sufficient condition for higher welfare under the same
regime, it is not also a necessary condition.
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1

Introduction

The degree of decentralization of public policies is a controversial topic. Indeed,
while the so called ”principle of subsidiarity” claims that it would be better to
decentralize to the jurisdictional level which is closer to the preferences of consumers and/or producers, in several circumstances environmental policies may
represent important exceptions to this principle (Oates [14]). This paper deals
with this issue with a specific focus on emissions trading. More specifically we
want to assess to what extent the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating permits within a federation of states should be centralized or delegated to
the single states.
Under this respect the implementation by the European Union of a trading
system for Greenhouse Gases emissions, as a step towards the achievement of
the Kyoto targets (Directive 2003/87/CE) represents an important evidence of
a decentralized emission trading system (ETS). Indeed, according to the Directive, permits are traded at the Union level, but permits allocation and monitoring duties are left to single member states. Such a decentralized structure
differentiates the EU ETS from the more standard model of emission trading
characterized by a central environmental authority that a) fixes a cap on total
emissions and issues a number of permits equal to the cap, and b) decides how
to monitor emissions sources in order to enforce full compliance or, at least,
minimize under-compliance1 .
The innovative structure of the EU ETS has been attracting the growing
interest of environmental economists and some recent insights suggest, on both
the theoretical and empirical grounds, that under a decentralized ETS member
states tend to over-allocate permits (D’Amato and Valentini [5] and Ellerman
and Buchner [6]). Nevertheless, one could argue that the inefficiency due to overallocation may be balanced if some monitoring cost advantage exists in favor
of single states2 The aim of this paper is indeed to investigate this eventuality.
Our results suggest that cost differential in monitoring violations can imply
lower emissions and greater welfare under a decentralized ETS than under a
centralized one. Nevertheless we also show that cost advantage in favor of single
states’ regulators is not sufficient to justify decentralization.
To derive these results we use a two stage game played by environmental
regulators and polluting industries. Regulators move first, choosing the emission
caps and, as in Malik [12], setting the level of monitoring effort to achieve full
compliance 3 . We deal with a federation of two countries under two alternative
1 As an example of a standard, centralized ETS we can think about the SO trading system
2
implemented in the US.
2 This assumption can be justified on the basis of the better knowledge that local authorities
have concerning the willingness to comply by firms, as well as on the lower costs involved in
the use of existing monitoring personnel and facilities. See also [3], where decentralization is
justified, among other things, in terms of centralized diseconomies of scale in administration
and technical expertise.
3 To assume full compliance is, in our view, close to actuality as, for example, the US SO
2
trading system even achieved overcompliance (see Svendsen [16]) and, if we focus on the EU
ETS, the ”...initial experience of the learning-by-doing phase of the scheme with respect to
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institutional frameworks, namely a centralized ETS, where there is a unique
federal regulator, and a decentralized ETS, where there are two local regulators
playing a ”Cournot game”, that is, each regulator chooses the emissions cap and
the monitoring effort taking other regulator’s choices as given4 . In the second
stage each firm observes the monitoring effort and the emission caps selected by
regulator(s) and chooses its emissions’ level.
We find that, under full compliance, emissions allocation in one country
causes a number of conflicting spillovers to the other country that a decentralized regulatory mechanism cannot internalize. Three spillovers are particularly
relevant: the first one is defined in the paper as pollution spillover, causing
lower environmental quality and lower welfare in the other country; the second is named enforcement spillover, causing higher environmental quality and
higher welfare in the other country; finally, we have a third, crucial spillover that
may cause opposite effects on environmental quality and welfare of the other
country depending on the sign of the asymmetry in monitoring cost between
the centralized regulator and the decentralized ones.
We conclude that environmental quality can be higher under decentralization only if some monitoring cost differential is accounted for. Indeed, when
there is no asymmetry between countries and between local and federal regulators, the third spillover cancels out, the pollution spillover always prevail over
the enforcement one, and decentralization always leads to higher emissions and
lower welfare. Similarly, when the monitoring cost differential is in favor of
decentralized regulators but it is not sufficiently high, yet a decentralized ETS
can be justified neither by environmental quality nor by a more general social
welfare analysis.
Environmental quality is higher under decentralization only if the monitoring
cost differential is sufficiently high in favor of decentralized regulators. Nevertheless, for specific functional forms used to carry out some additional welfare
analysis, we show that a better environmental quality is not a necessary condition for higher welfare under the decentralized ETS. As a matter of fact, it
may be the case that social welfare is higher under decentralization even if emissions are lower under a centralized regulator. This shows that, under certain
conditions, a higher emissions level is not, by itself, proof that decentralization
of emissions trading is bad, as decentralization could be a good way to tackle
monitoring problems in a cost effective way. Indeed, the cost differential may be
sufficient to counterbalance the consequent higher environmental damage that
would arise under the decentralized ETS.
On the other hand, a better environmental quality under the decentralized
ETS is a sufficient condition for higher welfare under the same regime. Indeed,
when the monitoring cost differential is particularly high in favor of decentralized regulators, decentralization features higher environmental quality which is
always coupled with higher welfare. This would be, of course the most favorable
case that could justify a decentralized ETS.
compliance and enforcement has been encouraging.” (European Commission [7], [p.8])).
4 In the paper we will discuss the implications of decentralization in a federal state, but our
results would hold unchanged if the focus were on an Economic Union.
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Two strands of the literature deal with questions which are closely related
to the issue analyzed in this paper. The first one is related to the so called ”environmental dumping” in both international (as in Barrett [1] and Ulph [17])
and federal settings (Ulph [18] and [19]). These papers show how national regulators attempt to relax environmental policy in order to secure to domestic
firms competitive advantages in international markets. Some more recent papers which are close in some sense to the ”environmental dumping” literature
deals specifically with emission trading. Among them Helm [9] analyzes the
allocation of emission permits under two alternative regulatory regimes, namely
with and without the possibility of trading permits. In his paper Helm finds
that the possibility of trading may induce more pollution since the higher number of permits chosen by environmentally less concerned countries may offset
the choices of the more concerned ones. In another paper, Boom and Dijkstra
[2] expand the analysis of Helm [9]. By including boundary solutions they show
that in some cases the results presented by Helm do not hold. Finally, D’Amato
and Valentini [5] show that a decentralized allocation of permits always results
in a lower than optimal price of permits, as well as in an aggregate emission
target which is larger than the socially optimal target that would arise under a
centralized solution. Our modelling strategy follows the one adopted by the environmental dumping literature, but regulator(s) do not only choose the amount
of allowances to be issued but also the level of monitoring and enforcement effort
to be devoted to discover and punish non compliant firms, as in the emission
permits enforcement literature.
The second strand of the literature to which our paper is strictly related is the
one on non-compliance under emission trading systems, starting with Malik [11]
and Keeler [10]. The authors examine the consequences of noncompliance for
a permits market, revealing that when firms are noncompliant permits markets
may not retain their efficiency properties. In a subsequent work, Malik [12]
includes explicitly enforcement costs in the comparison among incentive based
policies and standard command and control instruments, and conclude that the
ranking among the two kinds of instruments is not obvious in such a setting.
These papers are then extended, among others, by Van Egteren and Weber [20],
Malik [13] and Chavez and Stralund [4] to account for the interaction among
the chance for non compliance and the presence of market power. We also
contribute to this strand of literature since, to our knowledge, this is the first
attempt to investigate the consequences of decentralization when the choice of
enforcement effort is accounted for.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The main features of the
model are presented in the next section. Section 3 derives the solutions of
both the games defined under the decentralized and the centralized settings.
Section 4 presents a number of results based on some comparative statics. The
centralized and the decentralized regimes are compared in section 5 in terms of
both environmental quality and social welfare. Finally, section 6 concludes.

3
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2

The model

We analyze a stylized model representing an Economic Union formed by two
countries labelled as A and B. In each country i (i = A, B) there are a large
number of identical firms. By normalizing to 1 the number of firms in each
country, we deal with one ”representative” firm in each country (firm A and firm
B). We model two alternative institutional frameworks, namely a decentralized
emissions trading system (DETS ) and a centralized one (CETS ). Under the
DETS, we have a national environmental regulator in each country i (i = A, B)
while, under the CETS there is a single supranational regulator operating at
the Union level.
Before defining the interactions among the two firms and the regulator(s),
let us define
• ei as the level of actual polluting emissions generated by firm i; pollution
is assumed to be uniformly mixing;
• ei as the initial endowment of permits received by firm i;
• qi as the level of allowed emission, that is the level of permits held by firm
i;
• vi = ei − qi as the level of violation that can be chosen by firm i. When
vi = 0 there is no violation and the firm is perfectly compliant, while, the
firm is non compliant whenever vi > 05 ;
• ui as the level of monitoring effort required to induce firm i to be fully
compliant;
• p is the price for permits resulting from a competitive market operating
at the Economic Union level.
The interactions among the two firms and the regulators are characterized by
the following two stage games of complete (but imperfect) information defined
separately for the (DETS ) and the (CETS ).

2.1

The two stage game under the DETS

First stage: Each regulator i (i = A, B) chooses the level of monitoring effort
(ui ) in order to induce firm i to be fully compliant and the levels of emissions permits allocated to firm i (ei ) in order to maximize the national
social welfare
Wi = πi − ψi − Di

(1)

where i = A, B and
5 We

assume, without loss of generality, that overcompliance, that is vi < 0, never takes
place. In our simple model, any level of overcompliance would just imply the equilibrium
permits price to be driven to 0.

4
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• πi is the expected profit of firm i that will be better defined at the
second stage;
• ψi = ψi (ui ) is the cost of monitoring firm i under decentralization,
with ψi0 > 0 and ψi00 > 0;
• Di = Di (e), is the damage to country i caused from the uniformly
i
mixed pollution e defined as e = eA + eB , and where dD
de > 0 and
d2 Di
de2 > 0 (i = A, B).
Second stage: Each firm i (i = A, B) chooses actual emissions (ei ) and permits holding (qi ) in order to maximize its expected profit
πi = Bi − p(qi − ei ) − Ni ,

(2)

where i = A, B and
• Bi = Bi (ei ) is a strictly increasing and concave function of benefits
deriving from emissions (excluding permits and fine payments);
• p(qi − ei ) is the sum of money the firm spends (earns) if it is a net
buyer (seller) of permits where, given competitiveness in the permits
market, p is exogenously faced by firms.
• Ni = N (ui , vi ) represents firm i’s expected fine function6 which is
i
assumed to be increasing in the violation, i.e. ∂N
∂vi > 0, and in the
2

∂ N (ui ,vi )
7
i
degree of monitoring , i.e. ∂N
>
∂ui > 0 . We also impose that
∂vi2
0, which is reasonable, in order for second order conditions to be
(ui ,vi )
> 0, that is, the marginal increase in
satisfied. Finally, ∂N
∂ui ∂vi
expected penalty due to an increase in the violation increases with
monitoring effort.

It is worthwhile to note that the expected fine is a net transfer from the
firms to the regulator, then it can be omitted in the national social welfare
function (1).

2.2

The two stage game under the CETS

First stage: The centralized regulator chooses the levels of uA and uA in order
to induce firm A and firm B, respectively, to be full compliant, and the
levels of eA and eB required to maximize the aggregate social welfare
W = πA + πB − cA − cB − DA − DB

(3)

where
6 As in Malik [11] we assume that the firm is audited in an unexpected way and cannot
vary permits’ holding after realizing.
7 If we think about the expected fine as product of the fine times the audit probability,
then we can suppose that the audit probability depends on the degree of violation as well as
on the effort ui , and that the fine depends non linearly on the violation.

5
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• πi is the expected profit of firm’s i (i = A, B) that has been already
defined in section 2.1;
• ci = ci (ui ) is the centralized regulator’s cost of monitoring firm i,
with c0i > 0 and c00i > 0;
• Di = Di (e), is the damage caused from pollution to country i(i =
A, B) that has been already defined in section 2.1.
Also in the centralized case the expected fine is a net transfer....
Second stage: It is exactly the same as in section 2.1.
Of course, also under the CETS the expected fine is a net transfer from
the firms to the regulator. Then, it can be omitted also in the aggregate social
welfare function (3).

2.3

The market of permits

In this game the equilibrium price of permits is implicitly defined by the following market clearing condition8 :
qA + qB = eA + eB

(4)

where the total amounts of permits held by the firms, on the left hand side,
and total endowment of permits allocated to the firms, on the right hand side,
represent the demand and the supply of permits respectively.
The demand side is defined by the conditions characterizing the optimal
choices of the firms in the second stage of the game while the supply side is
defined in the first stage of the game when the environmental regulators choose
(at federal or national level) the amount of emission allowances to be issued to
the two ”representative” firms, taking into account how firms will react in the
second stage. In so doing the regulators realize that the equilibrium price in
the permits market can be influenced by their choice of ei (i = A, B), while
firms face an exogenous price p because they do not have market power in the
permits market.

3

The solutions of the games

In this section we first solve the two games defined under the DETS and under
the CETS in order to characterize the price of permits under the two alternative
regulatory settings.

3.1

The solution of the game under the DETS

To determine the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game we proceed backward. Therefore, we solve first the firms’ problem at the second stage of the
game and then the national regulators’ problem at the first stage.
8 We

limit our attention to the case of a strictly positive equilibrium permits price.

6
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3.1.1

The firms’ problem

By maximizing (2) we get the firms’ first order conditions w.r.t. ei
∂Bi (ei ) ∂N (ui , vi )
−
=0
∂ei
∂vi

(5)

and w.r.t. qi are:
−p +

∂N (ui , vi )
=0
∂vi

(6)

In order to achieve full compliance, from conditions (5) and (6), the monitoring efforts must be such that the following condition holds:
p=

∂N (uF
i , 0)
∂vi

(7)

that is, the marginal fine corresponding to full compliance must be equal to the
permits price. The above condition implicitly defines uF
i (p).
3.1.2

The regulators’ problem

Regulator i chooses the monitoring effort uF
i required to achieve full compliance and the amount of allowances to be issued to domestic firms in order to
maximize:
Wi = πi − ψi (uF
i ) − Dd (ei + ej )
that is,
Wi = Bi (ei ) − p(ei − ei ) − ψi (uF
i ) − Di (ei + ej )

(8)

Taking the first order conditions with respect to ei , and imposing
from (5) and (6), we get:
F
∂Wi
∂ψi (uF
∂p
i ) ∂ui ∂p
=p−
(ei − ei ) −
−
∂ei
∂ei
∂ui
∂p ∂ei

∂Bi (ei )
∂ei

=p


∂Di ∂ej ∂p
∂Di ∂ei
+
=0
∂ei ∂p
∂ej ∂p ∂ei


∂ej
∂p
i
Since the equilibrium on the permits market implies ∂e
+
∂p
∂p
∂ei = 1


and the uniformly mixing pollutant assumption implies
first order condition can therefore be rewritten as:

∂Di
∂ei

=

∂Di
∂ej ,

F
∂Wi
∂p
∂ψi (uF
∂Di
i ) ∂ui ∂p
=p−
(ei − ei ) −
−
=0
∂ei
∂ei
∂ui
∂p ∂ei
∂ei

the above

(9)

The corresponding first order conditions for country j are, of course:
F
∂ψj (uF
∂Wj
∂p
∂Dj
j ) ∂uj ∂p
=p−
(ej − ej ) −
−
=0
∂ej
∂ej
∂uj
∂p ∂ej
∂ej

(10)

7
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3.1.3

The price of permits

∂p
Solving (9) with respect to ∂e
(ei − ei ), accounting that the equilibrium on the
i
∂p
∂p
(ej − ej ) and substituting in (10) we
permits market implies ∂ei (ei − ei ) = − ∂e
j
get, after some manipulation, the following condition for the equilibrium price
of permits under decentralization:
!


F
F
∂ψj (uF
∂p 1 ∂Di
∂Dj
1 ∂ψi (uF
j ) ∂uj
i ) ∂ui
+
+
+
(11)
pd =
2
∂ui
∂p
∂uj
∂p
∂e 2 ∂ei
∂ei

3.2

The solution of the game under the CETS

Also for this game we have to proceed backward and solve first the firms’ problem
at the second stage of the game and then the centralized regulator’s problem at
the first stage.
3.2.1

The firms’ problem

Since the second stage of this game is the same as the second stage of the game
under the DETS, the firms’ first order conditions w.r.t. ei and w.r.t. qi are,
again, (5) and (6) defined in section 3.1.1. The same holds for the condition
implicitly defining full compliance effort, given in (7).
3.2.2

The regulator’s problem

The centralized regulator chooses emission allowances to be allocated to the
firms in the two countries in order to achieve full compliance and to maximize
(3). Under the CETS we can consider any permits revenue (cost) of firm i
(i = A, B) as an equivalent cost (revenue) of firm j (j = A, B, j 6= i). Therefore
we can rewrite (3) as follows:
F
W = Bd (eA ) + Bf (eB ) − cd (uF
d ) − cf (uf ) − Dd (eA + eB ) − Df (eA + eB ) (12)

By taking the first derivative of (12) with respect to ei (i = A, B) and using
the same arguments as in section 3.1.2, we get:
F
F
∂cj (uF
∂W
∂ci (uF
∂Di
∂Dj
j ) ∂uj ∂p
i ) ∂ui ∂p
=p−
−
−
−
=0
∂ei
∂ui
∂p ∂ei
∂uj
∂p ∂ei
∂ei
∂ei

3.2.3

(13)

The price of permits

By rearranging (13) we finally get the following condition, implicitly defining
the overall emissions target under the CETS :
pc =

F
F
∂cj (uF
∂ci (uF
∂Di
∂Dj
j ) ∂uj ∂p
i ) ∂ui ∂p
+
+
+
∂ui
∂p ∂e
∂uj
∂p ∂e
∂ei
∂ei

(14)

where pc is the equilibrium price of permits in a centralized setting.
8
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4

Some comparative statics

In this section we derive some interesting comparative statics results, using the
conditions derived so far. Comparative statics with respect to the permits price
leads to the following:
Result 1 Both emissions and permits’ holding decrease in the price of permits
but, as a whole, compliance decreases with the price of permits.
Proof. Note that
dei
=
dp

1
∂ 2 Bi (ei )
∂e2i

<0

and
dqi
1
= − ∂ 2 N (u ,v ) +
i i
dp
2
∂vi

dqi
dp

As a consequence,

>

dei
dp

1
∂ 2 Bi (ei )
∂e2i

< 0.

, so that

dvi
dei
dqi
=
−
> 0.
dp
dp
dp
Comparative statics with respect to the monitoring effort leads to the following:
Result 2 The level of actual emissions does not depend directly on the degree
of monitoring effort.
Proof. Simply note that
−∂
dei
=
dui

2

2
N (ui ,vi ) ∂ 2 N (ui ,vi )
N (ui ,vi ) ∂ 2 N (ui ,vi )
+ ∂ ∂u
∂ui ∂vi
∂vi2
∂vi2
i ∂vi
∂ 2 N (ui ,vi ) ∂ 2 Bi (ei )
− ∂v2
∂e2i
i

=0

This result is not really new in the literature. Indeed, both in Malik [11] and,
for the case of a firm facing emissions taxes, in Harford [8] the emissions’ choice
is independent of the probability that the firm is monitored. Strandlund and
Dhanda [15], moreover, show that this independence extends also to the degree
of enforcement pressure. Our very general definition of Ni (vi , ui ), however,
allows us to note that the independence from the monitoring effort (that may
be thought of as the result of an unspecified mix of both audit probability
and enforcement pressure) does not depend on the linearity of the expected
penalty in the monitoring effort, which is assumed by both Malik [11] and
Strandlund and Dhanda [15]. Result 2 does not imply that monitoring effort
cannot influence actual emissions at all. Indeed, we can also show that
9
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Result 3 An increase in monitoring effort causes permits demand to increase
and the same happens to the equilibrium permits price.
Proof. Given

∂N (ui ,vi )
∂ui ∂vi

> 0, then
dqi
=
dui

∂ 2 N (ui ,vi )
∂ui ∂vi
∂ 2 N (ui ,vi )
∂vi2

>0

that, in turn, can be used to show that also the sign of
equilibrium on the permits market implies:

dp
dui

is positive. The

qA + qB = e
and, as de = 0, comparative statics imply:
∂qA
∂qA
∂qB
∂qB
dp +
dp +
duA +
duB = 0
∂p
∂uA
∂p
∂uB
that is,
∂qi

dp
= − ∂qA ∂ui ∂qB > 0
dui
∂p + ∂p
for any i = A, B.
Therefore, immediate corollaries of results 1 and 3 are that, as noted by
both Malik [11] and Strandlund and Dhanda [15], an increase in the monitoring
effort indirectly decreases actual emissions via its effect on the permits price,
and that the violation is strictly decreasing in the monitoring effort, i.e.:
dvi
dqi
=−
< 0.
dui
dui
Finally, we can investigate the relationship between emission allowances and
their equilibrium price. As it is standard, we get:
Result 4 An increase in the initial endowment of permits in any country causes
the equilibrium permits price to decrease.
Proof. Again, the equilibrium on the permits market implies:
qA + qB = e
and, as dui = 0 for all i, comparative statics imply:


∂qA
∂qB
+
dp = de
∂p
∂p
that is,
dp
=
de

∂qA
∂p

1
+

∂qB
∂p

<0

10
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for any i = A, B.
We can use the above results to investigate the consequences of the full
∂uF
i (p)
compliance assumption. Comparative statics imply that ∂p
> 0. Combining
(7) and Result 4 we get to the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 An increase in allowances endowment in country i decreases
the effort needed both in country i and in country j to achieve full compliance.
Proof. Result 4 shows that

dp
de

< 0. As a consequence:

∂uF
i (p) dp
<0
∂p de
for any i.
In other words, the monitoring effort needed to achieve full compliance increases (decreases) with the equilibrium price of permits (the aggregate emission
cap). This conclusion suggests the existence of a positive spillover among countries in a decentralized setting: an increase in the national cap in country i
implies a decrease in permits’ price and, therefore, a decrease in the enforcement effort needed to achieve full compliance in country j. The relevance of
such spillover will be discussed in the following sections.

5

Environmental quality and social welfare

Comparing the first order conditions under decentralization with those arising
∂p
in a centralized setting and accounting for the fact that, in equilibrium, ∂e
(ei −
i
∂p
∂p
∂p
ei ) = − ∂ej (ej − ej ) and that ∂ei = ∂ej we get:
∂W ∂Wi
−
=
∂ei ∂ei



∂ψi (uF
∂ci (uF
i )
i )
−
∂ui
∂ui



F
∂cj (uF
∂uF
∂Dj ∂p
j ) ∂uj ∂p
i ∂p
−
−
−
(ej −ej )
∂p ∂ei
∂uj
∂p ∂ei ∂ei ∂ei

∂p
1. The term − ∂e
(ej − ej ) is due to the fact that an increase in the initial
i
allocation of permits in country i also decreases the equilibrium permits
price. If country j’s ”representative” firm is a net seller of permits, this will
cause a negative spillover on country j’s welfare. If the ”representative”
firm operating in country j is a net buyer of permits, this spillover will be
positive. The overall effect among the two countries cancels out, however,
because, when the permits market is in equilibrium, the positive spillover
in one country perfectly offsets the negative spillover in the other. Such
spillover is therefore likely to have only distributional consequences.
∂D

2. The term − ∂eij captures a second spillover: this is an international externality that the choice of the environmental authority of country i causes
to country j. As we know, an increase in permits by any country leads
to an increase in emissions that will also damage the other country. However, it is worthwhile to note that this externality is a consequence of the
11
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permits’ market per se, and it does not depend on the global nature of
the environmental issue we are dealing with. As a matter of fact, even
if the environmental damages of the two countries depended only on the
emissions generated within their borders an increase in ei would still bring
about more emissions in country j via the induced reduction in p. This
effect is discussed in detail by [5]. In the rest of the paper we will label
such international environmental externality as a pollution spillover.
 F

∂ci (uF
∂ui ∂p
∂ψi (uF
i )
i )
− ∂u
3. The term
∂ui
∂p ∂ei identifies the consequences of any
i
asymmetry in enforcement costs among centralized and decentralized institutional scenarios. The consequence of an asymmetry in monitoring
costs will be addressed in the last part of the paper. This term disappears
if no cost differential is assumed between centralized and decentralized
regulators.
∂cj (uF ) ∂uF

∂p
identifies a positive spillover among countries,
4. The term − ∂ujj ∂pj ∂e
i
already explained in Proposition 1: an increase in permits endowment in
country i leads to a decrease in equilibrium permits price and, therefore,
to a decrease in the amount of monitoring effort needed to achieve full
compliance, leading to a reduction in related costs. We call such spillover
enforcement spillover.

The net effect of the four spillovers is not obvious or straightforward. To
F
gain further insights, assume now that countries are symmetric. As uF
i = uj =
uF , this amounts to assuming that,
∂ψi (.)
∂ui

∂ci (.)
∂ui

=

∂c(.)
∂ui

in a centralized setting and

∂ψ(.)
∂ui

=
in a decentralized setting, for (i = A, B). Further, assume that
the damage function is symmetric (i.e. Di (.) = Dj (.) = D(.)) and the same
holds for the benefits function (i.e. Bi (.) = Bj (.) = B(.)). As a consequence,
we can rewrite condition (14) and (11) as:
p=2

∂c(uF ) ∂uF ∂p
∂D
+2
∂ui ∂p ∂e
∂ei

∂ψ(uF ) ∂uF ∂p ∂D
+
∂ui
∂p ∂e
∂ei
The following result is, then, straightforward.
p=

(15)
(16)

Proposition 2 If no asymmetry is introduced among countries and/or institutional settings, then the positive enforcement spillover is always dominated
by the negative pollution spillover.
Proof. The result follows immeditely from either (15) and (16) and the
assumption of a strictly positive permits price.
It is not easy to get further readable insights; however, we can investigate
the consequences of decentralization if no cost advantage is assumed in favour
of a decentralized setting. More specifically, assume that c(.) = ψ(.). We get
therefore to the following:
12
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Proposition 3 If no asymmetry is introduced among countries and/or institutional settings, decentralization per se always leads to higher emissions than
centralization.
Proof. Given our additional symmetry assumptions, we can rewrite the
first order conditions for the centralized and decentralized case, respectively, as
follows9 :
∂B(.) ∂c(uF (ec )) ∂uF (ec ) ∂p (ec ) ∂D (ec )
∂D (ec ) ∂c(uF (ec )) ∂uF (ec ) ∂p (ec )
−
−
=
+
∂ei
∂u
∂p
∂e
∂ei
∂ei
∂u
∂p
∂ei
(17)
∂B(.) ∂c(uF (en )) ∂uF (en ) ∂p (en ) ∂D (en )
−
−
=0
(18)
∂ei
∂ui
∂p
∂ei
∂ei
where the right hand side in (17) is strictly positive by Proposition 2, while in
(18) we accounted for the fact that under perfect symmetry there is no trading
of permits in equilibrium. As the left hand side of both (17) and (18) must be
decreasing in ei to ensure that the decentralized regulators problems are concave
problems, the proof is completed.
The last two results have relevant consequences on the choice betrween a
centralized and a decentralized setting. More specifically, in a perfectly symmetric framework, the choice of a decentralized setting cannot be supported
either in terms of social welfare (which is of course higher by definition in a
centralized setting) or under an environmental quality point of view. Further,
Proposition 2 implies that, unless the permits price is driven to 0, full compliance does not alter the presence of an ”aggregate” negative spillover among
countries in a decentralized setting.

5.1
5.1.1

Asymmetry in monitoring costs
Model results

A symmetric setting is useful as a benchmark, and it allows to investigate all the
consequences of decentralization per se. As we demonstrated, when countries
are completely identical and there is no monitoring cost advantage favouring decentralization, the latter cannot be justified under any respect. So why should
we choose decentralization in the first place? As already outlined in the introduction, the answer to this question might depend on the relative ease in
monitoring and enforcement that might characterize countries belonging to an
Economic Union (or to a federation of States). In order to get readable insights
we need, however, to keep the symmetric countries assumption and to introduce
specific functional forms for costs, benefits and social welfare functions.
We assume for country i (i = A, B) the following specific shapes for the
expected benefits and expected fine functions:
B(ei ) = ei −

e2i
2

9 e and e are, respectively, aggregate environmental standards under centralization and
c
n
decentralization.
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and

Ni (ui , vi ) =

ui F (qi − ei ) + 21 (qi − ei )2
0 otherwise



for qi > ei

where F is a positive constant representing the unit fine for noncompliance.
The quadratic term is related to the likely obligation of regulated firms to abate
excess pollution once found uncompliant.
The damage function for each country is quadratic and implies (coherently
with the assumption of symmetry among countries) that marginal damage is
the same in country A and B for any given amount of total emissions:
D(.) =

1
(eA + eB )2
2

Finally, the monitoring cost function is assumed to be linear in monitoring
effort, and is the only source of asymmetry among institutional settings. More
specifically, under centralization:
c(.) = λu,
while in a decentralized setting:
ψ(.) = λd u.
Using the above functional forms and solving the firms’ and regulators’ maximization problem we get the following values for aggregate environmental targets, equilibrium price of permits, monitoring needed to achieve full compliance
and social welfare (notice that, as before, subscripts c label values obtained in
a centralized setting, while d labels decentralization results10 :

Emissions
Price
Monitoring
Welfare

5.1.2

Centralized
1
ec = 5F
(2F + 2λ)
1
pc = 5F
(4F − λ)
uc = 5F1 2 (4F − λ)

Wc = 5F1 2 F 2 − 8F λ + λ2

Decentralized
1
ed = 3F
(2F + λd )
1
pd = 6F
(4F − λd )
ud = 6F1 2 (4F − λd )

1
Wd = 36F
4F 2 − 56F λd + 7λ2d
2

Comparisons

In order to make comparisons easier, we assume the following relationship between centralized and decentralized monitoring costs:
λ = ηλd
where
10 We

do not go into the details of the numerical calculations, that are coherent with the
implicit calculations performed in the preceeding sections. All the details are available from
the authors upon request. Further, in order to guarantee that price of permits is not driven
to 0, we must assume that λ < 4F.

14
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• when η ∈ (0, 1) monitoring is more costly under decentralization, while
• when η ∈ (1, ∞) there is a cost advantage in favour of decentralized regulators.
The comparison of aggregate caps arising under centralization and in a decentralized setting leads to the following result:
1
(5λd + 4F − 6λd η)
15F
which is negative, implying a higher cap in the centralized case, if
∆e = ed − ec =

η>

1
(4F + 5λd ) = ηe
6λd

where it is easily shown that ηe > 1.
We can therefore state the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 A sufficiently high cost differential in favor of the decentralized regulators leads the aggregate cap to be higher under centralization. More
specifically, in our modeling framework, we get the following two cases:
• if 0 < η < ηe then ∆e > 0
• if η > ηe then ∆e < 0.
The intuition for this result is as follows; when the cost differential is very
high then the ”differential” incentive of the centralized regulator to decrease
permits price to achieve full compliance with lower monitoring effort is so strong
to counterbalance any negative spillover among countries related to emissions.
When the cost differential is not very high, the opposite happens.
Turning to welfare comparison we get:

∆W = Wd − Wc =

1 35λ2d + 288ηλd F − 16F 2 − 280F λd − 36η 2 λ2d
.
180
F2
√

√

−λd )
−λd )
2
1
; ηW
= 16 24F + 35(4F
.
Introduce the following notation: ηW
= 16 24F − 35(4F
λd
λd
4F
2
1
2
It is easily shown that ηW > ηe > ηW > 1 and that ηW > λd . As a
2
consequence, we can never have the case that η > ηW
as it would imply a null
(decentralized) equilibrium permits price.
This leads us to the following Proposition.

Proposition 5 When centralization implies sufficiently higher monitoring costs
w.r.t. a decentralized setting, the latter results in a higher social welfare. More
specifically
1
• ∆W < 0 for η < ηW

15
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1
• ∆W > 0 for ηW
<η<

4F
λd

Results in propositions 4 and 5 can be summed up in three possible cases:
1
1. ∆W < 0 and ∆e > 0 for η < ηW

In this case the cost differential is sufficiently low to keep emissions higher
in a decentralized setting. The cost advantage under decentralization is
not enough to counterbalance the related environmental damage in terms
of social welfare.
1
< η < ηE
2. ∆W > 0 and ∆e > 0 for ηW

In this case emissions are higher in a decentralized setting, but decentralization also features a higher welfare. This could be the case because the
cost differential is now higher in favour of a decentralized setting.
3. ∆W > 0 and ∆e < 0 for ηE < η <

4F
λd

In this third case emissions are even higher under centralization. This is
the most favourable case for decentralization.
Notice, further, that λd plays an important role in determining all the above
1
threshold values. Taking the first derivative of ηe and ηW
with respect to λd we
get:

1
∂ηW
∂λn

∂ηe
2F
=− 2 <0
∂λn
3λd


F
2√
35 − 4
<0
=
3
λ2d

As a consequence, an increase in λd reduces the threshold above which emissions are higher in a centralized settingas well as the threshold above which
social welfare is higher in a decentralized setting.
Results obtained are coherent and add to those gained in section 4. A
number of lessons can be learned from our analysis:
• if no asymmetry among countries and/or institutional settings is introduced, decentralization cannot be justified under any respect (social welfare and/or environmental quality);
• the introduction of a monitoring cost differential in favour of decentralized
regulators is a necessary but not sufficient condition to provide support
to a decentralized ETS. Decentralization is only justifiable if such cost
differential is sufficiently high as to provide the centralized regulator with
relatively strong incentives to issue permits in order to drive the price (as
well as the monitoring effort) down.

16
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• An increase in decentralized (and, given η, centralized) unit monitoring
costs implies all the thresholds defined above to shift down, leading to an
even less favourable situation for centralization. This is reasonable: when
η > 1 the incentive for the central regulator to issue permits in order to
drive full compliance monitoring down grows more rapidly than the same
incentive in a decentralized setting.

6

Conclusion

In the paper, we have addressed the consequences of decentralizing compliance
monitoring and permits allocation under emissions trading within an economic
union. Using a two stage game played by two regulators, and their respective
polluting industries, we identified various spillovers among countries arising under decentralization.
Further steps for improving the study presented in this paper could be the extension of welfare analysis to a more general setting where no explicit functional
form is introduced, the removal of the symmetry assumptions among countries,
and the explicit modeling of the output market. Despite of these limits, by simply introducing the possibility of monitoring costs differential between national
environmental authorities and a centralized one operating at the federal level
we have been able to show that decentralization is not necessarily an inefficient
political choice. Indeed, high cost differential in monitoring violations can imply
lower emissions and greater welfare under a decentralized institutional setting
than under a centralized one. This result is particularly relevant since it allows
to find an economic justification for decentralization which is based on efficiency
and not on other political arguments as in D’Amato and Valentini [5].
On the other hand, we have also seen that cost advantage in favor of national states is not sufficient to justify decentralization. As a consequence, the
entity of possible cost differentials (if any) should be carefully evaluated in order to express any definitive judgement on the two alternative emission trading
regimes.
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